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WOMEN'S NAME RIGHTS
In the United States the great majority of women adopt the
surnames of their husbands upon marriage. This custom be-
came firmly established in a time when a woman, upon mar-
riage, merged her legal identity with that of her husband.'
However, the common law did not require that a woman use
her husband's surname. But in recent years some women have
refused to follow this customary pattern, maintaining among
other reasons that their surnames symbolized their individual
identity and their ancestral heritage.2
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in In re Petition of Kruzel,3
ruled that no law requires a married woman to change her
name when she marries. The Wisconsin court thus became the
second state supreme court to explicitly hold that, under the
common law, a woman's name does not automatically change
to that of her husband's upon marriage.' Rather, the court held
that a woman assumes her husband's name when she "habitu-
ally" or "customarily" uses it. According to the court's deci-
sion, a woman need not exclusively use her "antenuptial"
name to have it considered a "legal" 6 name. This comment will
analyze the court's reasoning in Kruzel, discuss its implica-
tions for Wisconsin women and men and examine the general
impact of this decision on women's name changes. To place
The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Priscilla Ruth
MacDougall, Staff Counsel to the Wisconsin Education Association and a director of
the Center for Woman's Own Name, in the preparation of this comment.
1. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 154 (3rd ed. 1890) [hereinafter cited as
BLACKSTONE].
2. The reasons women give for this decision are varied. See, BOOKLET FOR WOMEN
WHO WISH TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN NAMES AFTER MARRIAGE (1974) and 1975 Supple-
ment, compiled by the Center for a Woman's Own Name.
3. 67 Wis. 2d 138, 226 N.W.2d 458 (1975). Four groups entered as amicus, filing
two joint briefs: The American Civil Liberties Union, National Organization for
Women Legal Defense and Education Fund, University of Wisconsin Women's Law
Student Association and the Olympia Brown League.
4. The first was Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d
223 (1972).
5. The majority in Kruzel used the term "antenuptial" surname which is any name
used at the time of marriage, whether or not it is the "birth" or "maiden" name.
6. The majority does not speak in terms of "legal" v. "fictitious" or "illegal"
names. For a discussion of the evolving concept of a person's "legal" name, see Mac-
Dougall, Women s Names in Wisconsin; In Re Petition of Kruzel, 48 Wis. BAR BULL.
4, 30 (August, 1975), [hereinafter cited as WIS. BAR BULL.]; MacDougall, The Right
of Women to Determine Their Own Names Irrespective of Marital Status, 1 FAMILY L.
REi'. 4005 (Dec. 10, 1974) [hereinafter cited as FAMILY L. REP.].
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this decision in perspective, the common law origins of name
change requirements will be explored and a survey of relevant
case law in other jurisdictions will be presented. In addition,
the constitutional implications of administrative regulations
and judicial decisions upholding a common name requirement
and thus requiring a woman to assume or to continue to use her
husband's surname will be considered.
IN RE PETITION OF KRUZEL
Kathleen Harney, an art teacher in the Milwaukee public
school system, continued to use her birth name after her mar-
riage. At no time had she used her husband's surname. The
school board informed her that to continue teaching and for
group insurance purposes, she either had to use her husband's
surname or "legally" change her name to Harney. Ms. Harney
petitioned the circuit court for a statutory name change.7 Sev-
eral other married Wisconsin women who wanted to resume
their birth names had been granted statutory name changes. s
Others have had the courts recognize their right to continue
using their antenuptial surnames by "establishing" their
names statutorily.' The trial judge denied Ms. Harney's peti-
tion, stating that it should be agreed before marriage that all
members of the family should bear the same surname. If they
cannot agree on a common surname, "it would be better for
them, any children they may have, and society in general that
they do not enter into the marriage relationship."'' 0 Relying on
American Jurisprudence" the trial court concluded that upon
marriage the wife's surname is changed to that of her husband.
Authorities cited in American Jurisprudence erroneously hold
that under the common law a woman is required to adopt her
husband's surname.
7. Wis. STAT. § 296.36 (1973).
8. See, e.g., In the Matter of a Change of Name for Patricia J. Bach, No. 392481
(Milwaukee County Cir. Ct., Milwaukee, Wis., Sept. 20, 1971); In re Smuckler, No.
134057 (Dane County Cir. Ct., Madison, Wis., Sept. 29, 1971); Susan Beck Walter
Petition for Change of Name to Susan Mary Beck, No. 394832 (Milwaukee County Cir.
Ct., Milwaukee, Wis., May 9, 1972). See also cases cited in Brief for Appellants at 17-
18, In re Petition of Kruzel, 67 Wis. 2d 138, 226 N.W.2d 458 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Appellant's Briefi.
9. In the Matter of the Establishment of the Name of Priscilla Ruth MacDougall,
No. 135463 (Dane County Cir. Ct., Madison, Wis., petition granted May 1, 1972).
10. 67 Wis. 2d at 142, 226 N.W.2d at 460.
11. 57 Am. JUR. 2d, Name, § 9 (1971) [hereinafter cited as AM. JUR. Name].
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In reversing the circuit court decision, the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court rejected the respondent's argument that the cus-
tom of taking the husband's surname at marriage has devel-
oped into a rule of common law. "While it is true that some
customs of society have developed into rules of law, there is no
evidence that in this jurisdiction the custom was ever accorded
that effect.' 2 The majority found that although case law was
silent on the issue, the state attorney general had repeatedly
held that a married woman is not obligated by law to assume
her husband's surname.' 3 In one situation a woman nominated
for public office and subsequently elected was married between
the nomination and general election. The attorney general,
when asked what name she must use when acting in her official
capacity, determined it was immaterial which name the
woman adopted for official use. "While a married woman gen-
erally takes and uses her husband's surname, there is nothing
in the laws of this state that affirmatively requires it."' 4 In
another opinion he held that Wisconsin Statutes do not abro-
gate the common law rule.
[Wihere it is not done for a fraudulent purpose, an individ-
ual may lawfully change his name at will without proceedings
of any sort, merely by adopting another name, and for all
purposes the name thus assumed will constitute his legal
name.'
5
It is important to note that in English law, upon which the
majority decision is grounded, "legal" names are established
by usage-"the surname of any person, male or female, is the
name by which he or she is generally known provided that the
name was not assumed for any fraudulent purpose."' 6
Although no Wisconsin case has dealt specifically with a
married woman's statutory name change, the supreme court in
Lane v. Duchac'7 refused to invalidate a mortgage on the
12. 67 Wis. 2d at 143, 226 N.W.2d at 461.
13. See Appellant's Brief, at 14, n. 41, supra note 8, for attorney general memos
and informational bulletins in force at the time of the Kruzel decision regulating state
administrative agencies in accord with the majority opinion. See also Wis. BAR BULL.,
supra note 6, at 34, n. 9, for a current update of state licensing statutes and state
statutes referring to names and name changes.
14. 13 Op. Arr'v GEN. Wis. 632, 633 (1924).
15. 20 Op. ATr'Y GEN. Wis. 627, 630 (1931).
16. Stone, The Status of Women in Great Britain, 20 AMER. J. COMP. 592, 606
(1972) jhereinafter cited as Stone].
17. 73 Wis. 646, 41 N.W. 962 (1889).
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grounds that it was executed by a married woman in her birth
name.
True, since her marriage she is entitled to the name of her
husband . . . but we are aware of no law that will invalidate-
obligations and conveyances executed by and to her in her
baptismal name, if she chose to give or take them in that
form. Hence, were she the owner of the note and mortgage in
suit, it would be no defense to her action upon them that they
were executed to her in her baptismal name. "
This case and the attorney general opinions demonstrate, the
court said, that the customary adoption and use of a husband's
name by his wife has not been interpreted as a rule of common
law in Wisconsin.
The majority also carefully examined state divorce laws and
statutes relating to persons licensed as professionals and con-
cluded that they do not require a mandatory change of name
upon marriage. Specificially, the court cited Wisconsin Stat-
utes section 247.201 as applicable only if a married woman
adopted her husband's name. It did not indicate that she was
required to do so. This section was amended in the fall of 1975
after Kruzel was decided. 2 The majority concluded that nei-
ther Wisconsin statutes nor the common law require a change
of name upon marriage or divorce. "A change of name results
from marriage only if, in accordance with common law princi-
ples, the surname of a married woman's husband is habitually
used by her."2' The court noted that since Ms. Harney was not
compelled to change her name, her petition for a statutory
name change was merely a request for judicial recognition that
she could continue to use her antenuptial surname after mar-
riage.
The majority did not address the issue of a married woman
who wanted to resume her antenuptial name after she had used
18. Id. at 654, 41 N.W. at 965.
19. Wis. STAT. § 247.20 (1973):
The court, upon granting a divorce in which alimony jurisdiction is terminated,
may allow the wife to resume her maiden name or the name of a former deceased
husband, or the name of a husband of a former marriage of which there are
children in her custody, unless there are children of the current marriage as to
whom the parental rights of the wife have not been terminated.
20. Wis. Laws 1975, ch. 94 § 78 (Oct. 27, 1975) amending Wis. STAT. § 247.20: "The
court, upon granting a divorce shall allow either spouse, upon request, to resume a
former legal surname, if any."
21. 67 Wis. 2d at 150, 226 N.W.2d at 464.
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her husband's name for a time, but in dicta the court indicated
that fraud was the only limiting factor. Applying the common
law rule espoused by the court, a married woman who wants
to resume use of her antenuptial name should have few prob-
lems. Under the common law a person can, in the absence of
fraud, acquire a new name by reputation and general usage.2"
Thus, a married woman could exercise her common law right
to use her antenuptial name and change records and docu-
ments accordingly. 3 She could also petition the court for a
statutory name change. Under the statute any state resident,
adult or minor, may petition for a change of name "if no suffi-
cient cause is shown to the contrary."2 The court, in dicta,
stated that the discretion granted a trial judge under the stat-
ute is "extremely narrow"2 and a refusal to grant a change of
name must be based on the facts and reasonable proof. "Under
the common law standard, a showing of fraud or misrepresen-
tation akin to fraud is necessary to deny a change of name."2
Therefore, in the absence of fraud, a married woman using her
husband's name who decided to resume her antenuptial name
or any other name could do so by usage or alternatively by
applying for a statutory name change.
It is significant that the court failed to cite Forbush v.
Wallace,2 a 1972 case in which a three-judge federal district
court upheld Alabama's regulation based on a conceded view
of the common law that required a married woman to use her
husband's surname when applying for a driver's license. Citing
administrative convenience, the federal court pointed out that
Alabama had a "simple and inexpensive" name change proce-
dure available to any person, including married women, thus
making plaintiff's injury, if any, "de minimus."25 The parties
conceded that under the common law, marriage required a
change of name. The United States Supreme Court affirmed in
22. Petition of Snook, 2 Hilton Rep. 566 (N.Y. 1859); DuBoulay v. DuBoulay, L.R.
2, P.C. 430 (1869); Smith v. United States Casualty Co., 197 N.Y. 420, 90 N.E. 947
(1910).
23. See, e.g., Petition of Hauptly, - Ind. -, 312 N.E.2d 857 (1974).
24. Wis. STAT. § 296.36 (1973).
25. 67 Wis. 2d at 153, 226 N.W.2d at 465.
26. Id. at 154, 226 N.W.2d at 466.
27. 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
28. Id. at 222.
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a per curiam opinion, without having briefs submitted or hear-
ing arguments.29
Justice Robert Hansen's dissent criticized the "habitual
user" 3° test which in effect, he said, ends the right of a married
woman to use either her married name or her maiden name, or
both. For the free and continued "either-or" alternatives of
Lane, there has been substituted a one-or-the-other election
apparently irrevocable once exercised.3' Because a Woman can
no longer use her husband's name if she is a habitual user of
her birth name, according to the dissent, there is no family
named used by husband, wife and children. "That there be
such single name available to spouses, and identifying their
children is inherent in the concept of marriage as a partner-
ship. '32 In Wisconsin there is no statutory requirement that a
spouse or a child adopt a particular family name.3 3 But relying
in part on Wisconsin Statutes section 247.20, the dissent stated
that the legislature supported this view of a common family
name, and any changes in this policy should be left to legisla-
tive enactment. In the fall of 1975, after Kruzel was decided,
the legislature did amend this statute. 4
Contrary to the dissent's assertion, the majority does not
equate habitual or customary use of a name with exclusive
use.3 The majority says a woman adopts a new name when she
"habitually" or "customarily" uses it. No exclusive use re-
quirement is mandated by the court. Part of the difference
between the majority view and the dissent stems from a misun-
derstanding about the common law rule on women's surnames
29. Bysiewicz and MacDonnell, Married Women's Surnames, 5 CONN. L. REv. 598,
613 (1973).
30. 67 Wis. 2d at 157, 226 N.W.2d at 467.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 159, 226 N.W.2d at 468.
33. The Wisconsin Attorney General has held that a child takes the surname of his
parent by custom. Therefore, a change of name of the father does not automatically
change the surname of the child. 21 Op. A'ry GEN. 528 (1932). Under Wisconsin
Statutes § 296.36 (1973), both parents have the right to statutorily change the name
of their legitimate children. A married couple has a mutual right to name the child at
birth. 62 Op. Arr'y GEN. 501 (1974). See Carlson, Surnames of Married Women and
Legitimate Children, 17 N.Y. L. FORUM 552 (1971) for a general discussion of children's
names.
34. Wis. Laws 1975, ch. 94 § 78 (Oct. 27, 1975) amending Wis. STAT. § 247.20. The
state legislature eliminated gender-based discriminatory classifications in various stat-
utes including § 247.20.
35. See, MacDougall, Kruzel: A Landmark Names Case, 1 WOMEN L. REP. 1.207
(May 1, 1975) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN L. REP.]; Wis. BAR BuLL., supra note 6.
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and surnames in general. To remedy this apparent confusion
it is necessary to examine early English history and the com-
mon law.
ENGLISH COMMON LAW
Under the common law, the surname by which a person was
known was considered to be a person's "legal" name." But
surnames are virtually unknown in England before the ninth
century and did not come into general use for at least another
one hundred years. 7 Hereditary surnames became the rule
rather than the exception in the latter part of the thirteenth
century. 8 A person's Christian or given name was considered
more important than a surname because it was given at bap-
tism. The Christian name could be changed on confirmation.
Otherwise, no change was possible. 39 "And this doth agree with
an ancient book, where it is holden that a man may have divers
names at divers times but not divers Christian names."40 Sur-
names were frequently adopted by a person or given to him or
her because of some characteristic, occupation, or place of birth
or residence. People often had several surnames during a life-
time.'
The relative unimportance of a person's surname was dem-
onstrated in the common law rule that, in the absence of fraud,
a person could change his or her surname at will without legal
proceedings by adopting a new name and becoming generally
known by that name. "Subject to certain restrictions imposed
in the case of aliens, the law prescribed no rules limiting a
man's liberty to change his name." 2 In some cases, especially
in the upper classes, men took the surnames of their wives, or
the wives kept their own surnames.13 Not until the passage of
an act of Henry VII establishing the parish registry system was
the practice of having all family members adopt the same sur-
name institutionalized. Under the act, all births, deaths and
36. Stone, supra note 16.
37. C. EWEN, A HISTORY OF SURNAMES OF THE BRITISH ISLES 389 (1931).
38. E. SMITH, THE STORY OF OUR NAMES 28 (1950) [hereinafter cited as SMrriH].
39. 23 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 555 (2nd ed. 1936) [hereinafter cited as 23
HADMIRYJ.
40. COKE. A COMMENTARY UPON LIT'TLETON 3a (1883).
41. Arnold, Personal Names, 15 YALE L.J. 227 (1905); P. REANY, THE ORIGINS OF
ENG;IIsII SURNANIES 83 (1967).
42. 23 HAILSBURY, supra note 39.
43. L.G. PINE. THE STORY OF SURNAMES 23 (1966).
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marriages were to be recorded and the father's name was gener-
ally used for recording purposes."
Upon marriage the identity of the wife was merged with
that of her husband. 5 This unity of person undoubtedly en-
couraged the custom of a woman's assuming her husband's
surname after marriage.
By marriage the husband and wife are one person in law;
that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is
suspended during the marriage or at least is. incorporated
and consolidated into that of her husband.4
The basis of a married woman's loss of legal rights was the
feudal doctrine of coverture.47 Coverture has been character-
ized as "the old common law fiction that the husband and wife
are one . . .[and] the one is the husband."4 Under this doc-
trine, a woman lost her separate legal existence. She was un-
able to make contracts or wills, convey property, or sue or be
sued without joining her husband. All her personal property
and possessions became the personal property of her husband.49
But single women, in the area of contracts and property, en-
joyed a legal status almost equal to that of single males.
Although most married women took their husband's sur-
name upon marriage, they were not legally required to do so
under the common law.
When a woman on her marriage assumes, as she usually does
in England, the surname of her husband in substitution for
her father's name, it may be said that she acquires a new
name by repute. The change of name is in fact, rather than
in law, a consequence of the marriage.5 '
A woman could retain her own name or the name of her first
husband after she remarried.-2 For example, the wife of Sir
Edward Coke, Lord Chief Justice of England, did not assume
44. SMITH, supra note 38.
45. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 361 (1966) (Black, J. dissenting).
49. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS 220 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
CLARKI.
50. Id. at 219.
51. 19 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 829 (3rd ed. 1957).
52. Cowley v. Cowley, A.C. 450 (1901).
1976]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
her husband's surname. 3
Under the civil law, a woman does not lose her antenuptial
name through marriage. Her legal name does not vary with a
change in her marital status. A wife may be known by her
husband's name socially, but under the civil law she does not
acquire his name as her "legal" name. 4
During the nineteenth century the Married Women's Prop-
erty Acts were enacted in most states, including Wisconsin,
and in England. 5 These statutes, designed to reduce the com-
mon law disabilities of married women, provided in part that
women be allowed to control their own property after marriage,
make contracts and take part in business activities. But full
legal status was not conferred upon women by these statutes.56
For example, not until 1920 with the passage of the nineteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution were women
granted universal suffrage in the United States. Even with the
passage of these statutes and their recognition of the separate
legal existence of a husband and wife, women continued to
adopt their husband's surnames. Many courts still viewed the
husband as the dominant person in the marriage. 7 The Mon-
tana court held that "the common law rule that a wife owes a
duty to her husband to attend to her household duties and to
work for the advancement of her husband's interests was not
changed by the Married Women's Acts.""
Concomitant with the passage of these acts, feminists in the
United States began to make increasing demands for an equal
role for women in society. The first women's rights convention,
held in 1848 in Seneca Falls, New York, adopted a declaration
of sentiments modeled after the Declaration of Independence
and passed a resolution demanding the vote for women.55 But
only a few feminists showed concern for retaining their birth
names after marriage. Most notorious was Lucy Stone.6" Upon
53. M. TURNER-SAMUELS, THE LAW OF MARRIED WOMEN 345 (1957).
54. M. PLAINOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW, No. 390, 258 (12th ed. 1959); Succes-
sion of Kneipp, 172 La. 441, 134 So. 376 (1931); Boothe v. Papale, Civ. Action No. 74-
1939 (E.D. La. 1974).
55. H. CLARK, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 322 (1965).
56. CLARK, supra note 49, at 222.
57. Barnett v. Barnett, 262 Ala. 655, 80 So. 2d 626 (1955).
58. In re Marsh's Estate, 125 Mont. 239, -, 234 P.2d 459, 462 (1951).
59. R. PAULSON, WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE AND PROHIBITION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
EQUALITY AND SOCIAL CONTROL 32 (1973).
60. A "Lucy Stoner" is a married woman who uses her maiden name as a surname,
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her marriage to Henry Blackwell in 1855, she continued to use
her own surname after checking with several attorneys about
the legality of this action. The future United States Chief Jus-
tice Salmon P. Chase assured her that the common law allowed
this.6' Nevertheless, she was denied the right to vote in an 1879
Massachusetts school board election because she refused to
register under her husband's name.12 A Racine, Wisconsin
woman, the Reverend Olympia Brown, who was the first
woman in America to be ordained to the ministry of a regularly
constituted ecclesiastical body, retained her own name after
her marriage to John Henry Willis in 1873.63 Another Wisconsin
woman, Fola La Follette, daughter of well-known Wisconsin
Senator Robert La Follette, kept her own name when she mar-
ried George Middleton." Some women used their birth names
for professional purposes. Susan Brandeis Gilbert, a lawyer and
daughter of the late Associate Justice of the Supreme Court,
Louis D. Brandeis, used her birth name in her practice of law.65
Thus under the common law a married woman is not com-
pelled to adopt her husband's surname. No state statutes today
specifically require -that a woman assume her husband's sur-
name,66 and an increasing number of women in recent years
have chosen to retain their birth names after marriage. But
many have encountered legal problems in doing so. Although
some confusion and misunderstanding of the common law was
apparent in earlier American case law, since Stuart and Kruzel
the cases have clearly established the common law right of
married women to retain their own names for all purposes.
WEB;TER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1961). For a
discussion of the early feminist movement, see MacDougall, Married Women's Com-
mon Law Right to Their Own Surnames, 1 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 2 (Fall/Winter
1972/73). 1hereinafter cited as MacDougall, WOME's RTs. L. REP.].
61. A. S. BLACKWELL, Lucy STONE: PIONEER OF WOMEN'S IGHTS 171 (1930).
62. E. HAYS, MORNING STAR 256 (1961).
63. R. KOHLER, THE STORY OF WISCONSIN WOMEN 51 (1948).
64. Id. at 80.
65. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1975 at 44, col. 8.
66. Hawaii was the last state to have a statutory provision requiring a woman to
assume her husband's surname after marriage. This statute was declared unconstitu-
tional by a state circuit court under the equal rights provision of the state constitution.
Cragum v. Hawaii and Kashimoto, Civ. No. 43175 (1st Cir. Ct. of Hawaii, Jan. 27,
1975), cited in 1 WOMEN L. REP. 1.162 (1975). Effective January 1, 1976, a Hawaii
statute provides for name selection at marriage by men and women, HAWAII REv. STAT.,
ch. 574.1 (1975 Supp.).
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AMERICAN CASE LAW
Recent American cases concerned specifically with the issue
of a married woman's "legal" name fall basically into two cate-
gories: (1) where a woman retained her antenuptial surname
after marriage but was required by an administrative ruling or
judicial interpretation thereof to use her husband's surname,
and (2) where a woman used her husband's surname but
wished to resume her birth name or some other name and her
petition for a statutory name change was denied. Included in
this first category are voter registration rules or motor vehicle
licensing regfilations that have been interpreted to require mar-
ried women to use their husbands' surnames. Kruzel spans
both categories. Although Ms. Harney had never used her hus-
band's surname, she was required by her employer to either use
his name for certain administrative purposes or obtain a statu-
tory name change. When she petitioned for a change of name,
her request was denied.
A separate but related category of cases deal directly with
notice requirements and only peripherally with the woman's
name issue. In these cases the courts have generally held that
a married woman using her husband's name failed to receive
adequate notice of judicial proceedings against her because
notice of publication or personal service was made in her birth
name." The courts did not impose a name on the woman but
merely recognized the name by which she was generally known
as her "lawful" name.
Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections for Howard
County"6 falls within the first category. The Maryland Court of
Appeals, when faced with a challenge to a regulation requiring
a woman to register to vote in her husband's name, became the
first state supreme court to explicitly rule that under the com-
mon law a woman is not compelled to take her husband's
name. Mary Stuart had consistently used her birth name after
her marriage, but the board of supervisors of elections can-
celled her voter registration when she refused to complete a
required change of name form. The trial court, citing the ne-
67. See, e.g., Morris v. Tracy, 58 Kan. 137, 48 P. 571 (1897); Claxton v. Simons,
114 Ohio App. -, 177 N.E.2d 511 (1961).
68. 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972). See Comment, The Right of a Married
Woman to Use Her Birth-Given Surname for Voter Registration, 32 MD. L. REV. 409
(1973) for a discussion and analysis of the case.
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cessity of accurate recordkeeping, ruled that she had to register
to vote under her husband's surname, her "legal" name. The
Maryland Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that a married
woman's surname does not automatically change to that of her
husband where the woman shows a clear intent to exclusively,
consistently and nonfraudulently use her birth name after mar-
riage. Although most women customarily adopt their hus-
band's surnames, "the mere fact of marriage does not, as a
matter of law, operate to establish the custom and tradition of
the majority as a rule of law binding upon all."69 The court
distinguished the Forbush case in a footnote, stating as follows:
The Supreme Court affirmance was without opinion and
since it was based on Alabama common law differing from
that of Maryland, it is not constitutional authority binding
upon us in applying the common law rule in force in Mary-
land.'
The Tennessee Supreme Court encountered a comparable
voting registration problem in Dunn v. Palermo.71 Rosary Pal-
ermo, a lawyer, had consistently used her own name after mar-
riage, but the voting registrar said state law required her to
reregister in her husband's name. When she refused, her name
was stricken from the registration lists. The state supreme
court held that the assumption by a woman of her husband's
surname is a matter of custom and not law.
So long as a person's name remains constant and consistent,
and unless and until changed in the prescribed manner, and
absent any fraudulent or legally impermissible intent, the
State has no legitimate concern.72
The court denied that permitting a married woman to keep her
own name would result in administrative chaos. Rather, the
court said, such a ruling could eliminate substantial adminis-
trative problems which occur incident to a change of name,
especially in light of the increasing number of divorces and
remarriages.
A similar administrative requirement confronted the fed-
eral district court in Walker v. Jackson.73 Although the state
69. 266 Md. at -, 295 A.2d at 227.
70. Id. at -. , 295 A.2d at 226 n. 2.
71. - Tenn. -, 522 S.W.2d 679 (1975).
72. Id. at -, 522 S.W.2d at 689.
73. 391 F. Supp. 1395 (E.D. Ark. 1975).
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attorney general had issued an opinion stating that married
women could register to vote under their birth name's under
Arkansas law,74 one county clerk-registrar required a married
woman to register under her husband's surname and a divorced
woman to register under her former husband's surname. The
clerk-registrar said he was not required to follow the attorney
general's opinion. He also required female voter registrants to
prefix their name with "Miss" or "Mrs." Four women chal-
lenged the requirements on common law and equal protection
grounds. The federal district court ruled that requiring a
woman to use her husband's name for voting purposes was
invalid and requiring the use of the prefixes "Miss" and "Mrs."
was a violation of the equal protection clause in the absence of
a similar requirement for males, or any interest in the state in
imposing this requiiement.
An earlier American case involving a woman who had never
used her husband's surname is State ex rel. Krupa v. Green,75
considered a primary authority on the common law right of
name change. A well-known lawyer retained her own name
after marriage.76 When she ran for municipal court judge, a
challenge was made to her use of her birth name on the nomi-
nation petition. Based on its analysis of the common law, the
appeals court ruled that the petition was valid.
It is only by custom, in English speaking countries, that a
woman, upon marriage, adopts the surname of her husband
in place of the surname of her father. The state of Ohio
follows this custom but there exists no law compelling it.71
Most women follow this custom of adopting their husband's
name, but some women, after initially following the custom,
want to resume their birth names and petition for statutory
name changes. Although no states require a woman to adopt
her husband's surname, 78 some lower courts have held that a
statutory name change is foreclosed to married women. Cases
74. 74 Op. ATr'Y GEN. ARK. 123 (1974).
75. 114 Ohio App. 497, 177 N.E.2d 616 (1961).
76. A prenuptial written contract stated that the woman, Blanche Krupansky, a
well-known lawyer who was listed in Who's Who of American Women, would retain
her own surname after marriage. A written agreement is not a requirement for name
retention as the court clearly indicated in Stuart, where an antenuptial agreement was
also involved.
77. 114 Ohio App. at 501, 177 N.E.2d at 619.
78. 1 WOMEN L. REP. 1.162 (1975).
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in this second category were presented to numerous courts in-
cluding the supreme courts in Indiana and Maine in recent
years, and both courts held that a married woman could re-
quest and receive a change of name to her birth name under
the state's name change law.
The Indiana Supreme Court, in Petition of Hauptly,7 said
in dicta that although the common law assumes that a married
woman adopts her husband's surname, the woman could
change her name with or without court proceedings. The Su-
preme Judicial Court of Maine, in In re Reben, 0 ruled that
failure to grant a married woman's requested change of name
back to her birth name was an abuse of judicial discretion. The
trial judge had denied the petition citing lack of a sufficient
purpose for the requested change. The supreme juducial court
did not decide the precise question as to whether a woman
takes her husband's name by operation of law. Rather, the
court held that because no evidence of fraud was alleged, the
lower court had abused its discretion in failing to grant the
petition. The court also based its decision on the fact that the
petitioner's husband supported her request, no children were
involved and no objections had been filed.
One suit has held that a married woman, in her request for
a name change, is not limited to a choice between her antenup-
tial name or her husband's name. In Matter of Natale,8' a Mis-
souri appeals court granted a statutory name change to a mar-
ried woman who had used her husband's surname after mar-
riage. She had been known by three surnames prior to her
marriage due to her mother's changing her name because of
remarriages and because of petitioner's one formal adoption. In
reversing the trial court, the appeals courts recognized both the
common law right and the statutory right of a married woman
to change her name. The court held that there was no require-
ment of a common surname. In thp absence of a showing of
harm to her future children, her spouse or creditors resulting
from the name change and because the surname chosen was
not bizarre, offensive or a name of a governmental body, the
court stated the petitioner was entitled to the statutory change
of name.
79. - Ind. ,312 N.E.2d 857 (1974).
80. - Me. -, 342 A.2d 688 (1975).
81. 527 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. App. 1975).
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This viewpoint has been adopted in a growing number of
state courts in recent years. These courts have upheld the right
of a married or divorced woman to keep her own name or to
change her name under the common law or under applicable
state name change statutes."2 Despite the support for the
common law rule as stated in Kruzel and other decisions, a
number of earlier cases, in dicta, state the opposite result that
upon marriage a woman, ipso facto, assumes her husband's
name and automatically abandons her own birth name. In only
one case reaching this result did the woman assert her common
law right and retain her birth name after marriage. s3
A married Chicago attorney wanted to maintain her voter
registration in her birth name. The appellate court said she
could not because it is "by common-law principles and imme-
morial custom that a woman upon marriage abandons her
maiden name and takes the husband's surname, with which is
used her own given name." 4 The court cited several cases in
support of its decision, none of which cited any English com-
mon law, but ignored all cases reaching an opposite result. The
court did cite Reinken v. Reinken 5 a 1933 case involving a
divorced woman who wished to resume her first husband's sur-
name, but apparently disregarded that court's reasoning that,
even without statutory permission, a woman has the right to
change her name under the common law.
Although Lipsky is cited as authority in various cases and
in American Jurisprudence,"8 the Illinois Attorney General has
rejected its holding. "I do not believe that this decision should
82. Custer v. Bonadies, 30 Conn. Supp. 385, 318 A.2d 639 (1974); Marshall v. State,
301 So. 2d 477 (Fla. App. 1974); Application of Halligan, 46 A.D.2d 170, 361 N.Y.S.2d
458 (1974); Application of Lawrence, 133 N.J. Super. 408, 337 A.2d 49 (1975); In re
Marriage of Banks, 43 Cal. App. 3d 631, 117 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1974); Egner v. Egner, 133
N.J. Super. 403, 337 A.2d 46 (1975); In re Mohlman, 26 N.C. App. 220, 216 S.E.2d 147
(1975). In Mohlman, the court ruled that a married woman could petition for a change
of name to her birth name but held that the woman involved in this case did not show
"good cause" and "good and sufficient reason" for the name change as required by
state statute. Davis v. Roos, No. X-369 (Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 1st Dist., Fla., filed Feb.
3, 1976).
83. People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky, 327 Ill. App. 63, 63 N.E.2d 642 (1945). Law review
commentators agree that Lipsky is based on an incorrect analysis of the law. See, e.g.,
MacDougal, WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP., supra note 60; Lamber, A Married Woman's Sur-
name: Is Custom Law? 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 779 (1973).
84. 327 Ill. App. 63, 67, 63 N.E.2d 642, 644 (1945).
85. 351 Ill. 409, 184 N.E. 639 (1933).
86. AM. JUR. Name, supra note 11.
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control. The other Illinois decisions and cases elsewhere estab-
lish that a woman may in fact retain her own name upon mar-
riage with or without court proceedings."87 The courts in Kruzel
and in Dunn explicitly rejected Lipsky and its view of the com-
mon law.
Freeman v. Hawkinss" was also cited in American
Jurisprudence,89 but this case does not fall within either cate-
gory of name cases because it dealt specifically with require-
ments for personal jurisdiction and only indirectly with the
general area of married women's surnames. In Freeman, the
court held that service by publication in the birth name of a
woman who had married and adopted her husband's surname
was inadequate to confer personal jurisdiction. In dicta, the
court said the law conferred on a woman the surname of her
husband. But a Texas case, Rice v. State,"° decided several
years later, reached an opposite conclusion. The court failed to
mention Freeman, thus negating its importance as precedent
in Texas.
One of the earliest and most influential cases on married
women's surnames is Chapman v. Phoenix National Bank,9'
another case involving adequacy of notice. Stocks registered in
the name of Verina S. Moore, birth name of Verina S. Chap-
man, were confiscated by the federal government during the
Civil War. A default judgment was entered against "Ver. S.
Moore" in New York, and Mrs. Chapman, who was then living
in North Carolina and had no notice of the action, moved to
vacate the judgment. The New York court held that the pro-
ceedings were defective because of lack of notice to Mrs. Chap-
man. In dicta the court stated:
For several centuries, by the common law among all English
speaking people, a woman, upon her marriage, takes her hus-
band's surname. That becomes her legal name, and she
ceases to be known by her maiden name. By that name she
must sue and be sued, make and take grants and execute all
legal documents. Her maiden surname is absolutely lost, and
she ceases to be known thereby.92
87. Op. A vr. GEN. ILL. No. 695, Feb. 13, 1974, cited in Dunn. v. Palermo, -
Tenn. at -, 522 S.W.2d at 684.
88. 77 Tex. 498, 14 S.W. 364 (1890).
89. Ai. JuR. NAME, supra note 11.
90. 37 Tex. Crim. 36, 38 S.W. 801 (1897).
91. 85 N.Y. 437 (1881).
92. Id. at 449.
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The Wisconsin court in Kruzel cited Chapman but pointed
out that in Application of Halligan," a unanimous New York
court held that a married woman could use her birth name as
her legal name in New York. The Wisconsin court interpreted
Halligan as specifically negating the precedential effect of
Chapman.
The cases holding that a married woman must adopt her
husband's surname often form the basis for such trial court
decisions as that in Kruzel. But, there are several drawbacks
in these decisions. None of the cases examine the common law
origin of names and name changes to determine if the common
law in fact supports their conclusions. They generally fail to
cite authorites and cases holding an opposing view. Only one
case, Lipsky, dealt specifically with a married woman who con-
sistently used her birth name after marriage, maintaining that
she had a common law right to do so. Since the married
woman's legal name issue was peripheral in some cases to the
overriding issue of adequacy of notice and service of process,
many courts never carefully examined the name issue alone. In
addition, the majority of these cases were decided before the
rise of the women's movement in the mid 1960's. With the
growth of the movement and its demands for equal rights for
women, legislatures and the courts have increasingly recog-
nized the problem of sex discrimination and taken affirmative
steps to correct it through legislation94 and judicial decisions."
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The Kruzel decision recognized the common law right of a
married woman to use her birth name or any other name she
chooses. The trial court in Kruzel framed its opinion in terms
93. 46 A.D.2d 170, 361 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1974).
94. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination by an em-
ployer, labor organization or other organization covered by the Act based on "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(b)(c) (1970). The Equal
Pay Act of 1963 prohibits wage discrimination by employers on the basis of sex. 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
95. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973). As late as 1961, the United States Supreme Court upheld a statute prohib-
iting women from jury duty unless they volunteered, stating that a woman "is still
regarded as the center of home and family life." Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
The Court recently held that women as a class cannot be excluded or automatically
exempted from jury service solely on the basis of sex if the consequence is that criminal
jury venires are almost all male. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
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of a common family surname, stating that family unity "re-
quires that all members thereof bear the same legal name.""6
To avoid the "inevitable clash between his ruling and the four-
teenth amendment,"97 the trial judge stated that both marriage
partners could petition for a name change if they agreed that
the wife's maiden name or any other name should be the legal
name of the parties. The ACLU-NOW LDEF amici curiae brief
challenged this contention stating that unquestionably this
"will operate under the weight of custom to coerce women into
surrendering their birth names, thus elevating custom into law
and denying women the equal protection of the laws as guaran-
teed by the fourteenth amendment. '9 6
Using an analogy to cases arising under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,11 the argument was made that:
Just as superficially neutral employment qualifications that
have a discriminatory impact must fall unless they "bear a
demonstrable relationship to successful [job] performance,"
so the rule applied in the case at bar [Kruzel] must fail, for
the bearing of an identical surname by all members of a
family is not critical to or even demonstrably supportive of
family stability. '
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Kruzel did not have to
deal with constitutional issues involved in a common surname
requirement as advocated by the trial court because it based
its decision solely on the common law. But if a court mandates
a common surname or holds that reregistration statutes require
96. Appellant's Brief, supra note 8, at Appendix 104.
97. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union and National Organization for Women
Legal Defense and Education Fund as amici curiae at 3, Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d
138, 226 N.W.2d 458 (1975) [hereinafter ACLU-NOW LDEF Amici Briefn.
98. Id. at 3-4.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Title VII forms a basis of appeal to the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Allen v. Lovejoy, No. 76-1081 (6th Cir. 1976). In the case, a federal
district court in Tennessee refused to grant back-pay to a woman who was suspended
from her job for refusing to comply with a County Health Dept. rule requiring a woman
employee to use her husband's surname on personnel forms and for refusing to utilize
available department appeals procedures. The County Board of Commissioners subse-
quently revised the rule and the employee was reinstated. The Court ruled that the
employee was required to use the department's appeals process before she could claim
deprivation of property without due process. The court did not examine the issue of
whether a woman necessarily had to adopt her husband's surname upon marriage.
Allen v. Lovejoy, Civ. No. 0175-118 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 23, 1975).
100. ACLU-NOW LDEF Amici Brief supra note 97, at 8, citing Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1974).
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married women to reregister with the voting registrar or motor
vehicle department when their names are changed by mar-
riage, these constitutional arguments should be raised. These
requirements and court decisions holding that married women
must adopt their husbands' surnames upon marriage seem in-
creasingly subject to constitutional attack based on recent ju-
dicial interpretations of the equal protection and due process
clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
A requirement that a woman adopt her husband's surname
without imposing a similar requirement on the husband creates
a classification based upon sex. The courts have held that
states may establish classifications but there must be a ra-
tional basis for them. In addition, the classification must have
a "substantial relation to the object of the legislation so that
all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."'' It
is difficult to see the rational basis for requiring a woman to
adopt her husband's surname so that husband and wife will
have a common surname. Even a requirement such as the trial
court espoused in Kruzel, that either husband or wife could
change his or her name or both agree to adopt a new name,
would not meet a constitutional challenge. "The purportedly
'sex-neutral' ruling that one party to a marriage must relin-
quish his/her name is invidiously discriminatory in its impact
on women .... ",,02
In the area of administrative convenience, a rational basis
was found by the three-judge panel in Forbush v. Wallace13 for
Alabama's regulation requiring that a married woman obtain
a driver's license in her husband's name. The court specifically
noted that Alabama offered a "simple, inexpensive means"''
by which any person, including married women, could statuto-
101. F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
102. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae in Stuart v. Board
of Supervisors of Elections, 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1973), cited in BOOKLET FOR
WOMEN WHO WISH TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN NAMES AFTER MARRIAGE (1974).
103. 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 970 (1972). The
constitutional issues raised in Forbush are being litigated in Whitlow v. Hodges, No.
74-1726 (6th Cir. 1974) on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky. Civ. No. 74-7 (E.D. Ky., Feb. 14, 1975). For a discussion of the
constitutional issues and the Forbush case, see, e.g., FAMILY L. REP. supra note 6;
Lamber, supra note 83; Daum, The Right of Married Women to Assert Their Own
Names, 8 MICH. J. LAW REFORM 63 (1974); Gordon, Pre-Marriage Name Change, Re-
sumption and Reregistration Statutes, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1508 (1974); Comment, The
Right of Women to Use Their Maiden Name, 38 ALBANY L. REV. 105 (1973).
104. 341 F. Supp. 217, 222 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
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rily change his or her name. Without this, the court may not
have reached the same result. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the district court in Forbush without opinion.
The previous year the Supreme Court had explicitly rejected
this administrative convenience reasoning in Reed v. Reed.' °5
The Court, in holding that an Idaho statute requiring males to
be preferred over females in appointing administrators of es-
tates was a denial of equal protection, found that no rational
relationship existed between the classification based on sex
and the stated objective of the statute. Some commentators
observe that in married women's name change cases the sub-
stance of the argument that administrative convenience neces-
sitates that a woman adopt her husband's surname
lies not in the inherent convenience or virtue of changing
names upon marriage, but in the temporary inconvenience of
changing from one system of registration to another, a basis
that should never by itself support an arbitrary classifica-
tion. 10
A much stricter standard than the rational basis test is
applied where a statute abridges a fundamental right 07 or cre-
ates a suspect classification such as race.'0 Any such infringe-
ment can only be tolerated if a "compelling governmental in-
terest" is demonstrated. 10 In Frontiero v. Richardson, ° four
justices agreed for the first time that sex was a suspect classifi-
cation and a fifth, Justice Powell, specifically refused to rule
on the issue because of the pendency of the Equal Rights
Amendment. The court invalidated a statute on due process
grounds which permitted a presumption of dependency in the
case of a serviceman's family but not in the case of a service-
woman's family. In its increasing scrutiny of discrimination
based on gender, the Court has had ample opportunity to de-
clare sex a suspect classification, but has declined to do so. At
first glance it seems unlikely on the basis of these decisions and
the current membership of the court that the stand on this
issue will change.
105. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
106. Lamber, supra note 83.
107. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
108. E.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
109. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
110. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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Arbitrary name change laws or common surname require-
ments which discriminate against married women can also be
challenged as an infringement of a fundamental right. Two
interrelated approaches could be used. The personal right of
privacy as well as marriage itself are recognized fundamental
rights. Marriage is a basic civil right "fundamental to our very
existence and survival.""' The Supreme Court, in interpreting
the equal protection doctrine, "demands recognition of mar-
riage as a relationship between equals-a relationship in which
neither may be assumed the dominant partner."' ' A regulation
or judicial decision which arbitrarily requires a woman to give
up her antenuptial name at marriage or requires a common
surname which would have a disparate impact on women ne-
gates the idea of equality and directly impinges on the funda-
mental marriage relationship. Based on recent court decisions,
it is doubtful whether a compelling state interest in such a
common name requirement could withstand judicial scrutiny
on equal protection or due process grounds." 3
The personal right of privacy is also a recognized fundamen-
tal right, "4 requiring that any limitation be justified by a com-
pelling state interest. Justice Douglas, concurring in Roe v.
Wade,"' defined this right as "the privilege of an individual to
plan his own affairs."" 6 Justice Brandeis called it the right "to
be let alone.""' Case law or administrative regulations which
demand that a woman, when she marries, use a particular
surname could be deemed a violation of the ninth amendment
and the privacy right.
The proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)," 8 which
has been approved by thirty-four of the thirty-eight states nec-
essary for ratification, may provide an additional legal basis for
111. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
112. ACLU-NOW LDEF Amici Brief, supra note 97, at 5.
113. E.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
114. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
115. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
116. Id. at 213.
117. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928), (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
118. H.R.J. Res., No. 208, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972): "Equality of rights under
the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account
of sex."
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challenging these regulations and judicial decisions. The actual
impact of the ERA will not be known unless it is adopted by
the states and subsequently interpreted by the courts. Some
commentators believe the amendment will make sex a suspect
classification, thereby requiring a compelling state interest to
allow a particular classification based on sex."' Other commen-
tators say that classification based solely upon sex will be pro-
hibited absolutely.
In a case where a married woman wished to retain or regain
her maiden or some new name, a court would have to permit
her to do so if it would permit a man in a similar situation to
keep the name he had before marriage or change to a new
name. Thus common law and statutory rules requiring name
change for the married woman would become legal nulli-
ties. 2 0
Another commentator states, "There can be no question that
when the Equal Rights Amendment is ratified, no woman can
be compelled to change her legal name each time she remar-
ries."' 2 ' Based on this reasoning, a common surname require-
ment would also be prohibited by the ERA. A third viewpoint
holds that the Equal Rights Amendment will have no effect on
a married woman's right to retain her own name.in
Whatever the ultimate result of the ERA, it seems likely in
the light of recent court decisions, that requirements compel-
ling women to adopt their husbands' surnames for whatever
reason or mandating a common surname will raise serious con-
stitutional questions and will be subject to careful scrutiny by
the courts.
CONCLUSION
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that mar-
ried women can retain their own names, the majority of women
in Wisconsin will probably continue to change names when
they marry and use the same surname as their husbands. But
for an increasing number of women, the decision represents a
119. Karst, "A Discrimination So Trivial" A Note on Law and the Symbolism of
Women's Dependency, 49 L.A. BAR BULL. 499, 508, (Oct. 1974).
120. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Friedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Consti-
tutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 940 (1971).
121. MacDougall, WOMEN's RTs. L. REP., supra note 60, at 14.
122. L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW 40 (1969).
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recognition by the court of the right of a woman to her own
identify, separate from that of her husband. It is important as
a symbolic statement of equality of rights under the law.
The court in Kruzel presented a succinct, well-reasoned
decision that under the common law a married woman does not
have to adopt the surname of her husband. But, if she chooses,
she may "habitually" or "customarily" use her husband's
name and thereby adopt his name by usage and repute. The
dissent argued that the majority holding locked a woman into
choosing and using one name and one name only as her "legal"
name. The majority, significantly did not use the term "exclu-
sively" and clearly no such implication should be made. The
court merely said a woman can adopt a name by habitual and
customary use. But if a woman uses a name other than her
husband's surname, she might have to use that name consis-
tently and exclusively to avoid any presumption that, as a
married woman, she is better known by his surname.2 3
Although the majority declined to rule on the issue of
whether a married woman who used her husband's surname
can resume her birth name, this should constitute no major
problem using the court's own reasoning. Under the common
law, a person may acquire a new name by general usage. There-
fore, a married woman could simply resume use of her birth
name or she could petition for a statutory change of name.
Under Wisconsin law, the change will be granted "if no suffi-
cient cause is shown to the contrary."'' 4 The majority, in dicta,
stated that the trial court's discretion under the statute is "ex-
tremely narrow"'25 and any refusal must be based on the facts
and reasonable proof. Thus, in the absence of fraud, a married
woman would generally be granted a statutory name change in
Wisconsin. This view is further buttressed by the recent legisla-
tive enactment amending Wisconsin Statutes section 247.20,26
which provides that upon request either sposue may as a mat-
ter of right resume any "former legal surname" upon the grant-
ing of a divorce. This statutory amendment also substantially
weakens the argument of the dissent which relied on the origi-
123. FAMuLY L. REP., supra note 6.
124. Wis. STATS. § 296.36 (1973).
125. 67 Wis. 2d at 153, 226 N.W.2d at 468.
126. Wis. STATS. § 247.20 (1973).
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nal statute to show legislative recognition of a "single family
name acquired by marriage.' '1 27
The court's decision, with. its analysis of common law views
on surnames of married women and its careful examination of
state statutes, can serve as a guide for other states in the area
of personal names. Kruzel also clarifies any misunderstanding
that might have existed in Wisconsin concerning the right of a
woman to retain her birth name after marriage.
PATRICIA J. GORENCE
127. 67 Wis. 2d at 160, 226 N.W.2d at 472.

